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ABSTRACT 
In light of the United States recently withdrawing its support for the 
Paris Climate Agreement, and the long history of unsuccessful attempts 
to achieve a global climate deal, this Article proposes establishing an 
international climate court. The international climate court would 
monitor nations’ progress in accomplishing their climate goals and 
enforce the provisions of the Paris Climate Agreement and any 
agreement to come after it. This Article first reviews the long history of 
* Vinita Banthia is an attorney practicing civil litigation at Blackwell Burke P.A. in
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countries struggling to arrive at a climate deal and outlines the current 
state of climate politics. It then discusses the specific need for an 
enforcement mechanism for climate agreements and offers the 
establishment of an international climate court as the most viable 
solution. This Article further proposes specific details for the structure 
and mandate of the climate court, addressing short-comings and 
barriers to its establishment. In conclusion, this Article suggests that 
the establishment of an international climate court would be the most 
effective method to reduce global environmental harm in a timely 
manner. 
INTRODUCTION 
n November 30, 2015, over 50,000 delegates from 190 
countries, convened in Paris for the United Nations Conference 
on Climate Change, also known as the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP).1 The conference was the most recent effort by all United 
Nations (U.N.) member countries to draft a plan to reduce human-
induced greenhouse gas emissions. In 1972, the first U.N. 
environmental conference took place in Stockholm, Sweden, where 
member countries acknowledged a dangerous “greenhouse effect” over 
the earth and the likelihood that it was caused by human activities.2 
While member nations at that meeting agreed that a collaborated effort 
was needed to address global warming, little more was established in 
Stockholm.3 In the years to follow, more rigorous discussions took 
place, and stringent emission restrictions were proposed through 
summits, treaties, and international pressures. Although these efforts 
1 CLIMATE ACTION & UNEP, Find Out More About COP21, CLIMATE ACTION & UNEP, 
http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21 (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
2 On the eve of the Paris COP, delegates received the tragic news of the death of Maurice 
Strong—the man who headed the first international climate conference in 1972 and is 
considered the father of the international climate movement. The timing of his death served 
as a reminder to world leaders of the on-going long road that climate negotiations have been, 
and may have motivated delegates to work hard to come to an agreement. Alan Neuhauser, 
Primer: The Paris Climate Summit, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 30, 2015, 12:01AM EST), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/11/30/primer-the-un-climate-summit-in-
paris. 
3 See generally A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, EPA, 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange//kids/index.html (last visited Mar. 20Jan 26, 2019). 
O 
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have had mixed success, there has been growing consensus that 
emission levels are increasing internationally.4 
When this Article was written, three years after the 2015 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, the road to an 
international climate agreement continued to be a bumpy one. 
Developing and implementing an emission reduction plan involves 
complex political, social, and scientific pressures. For example, 
although Canada ratified and played a key role in negotiating the Kyoto 
Protocol (the Protocol) under a liberal government in 2002, it later 
backed out of the Protocol under the leadership of a conservative, oil-
and-gas supporting government.5 Most recently, the United States 
withdrew from the Paris Agreement (the Agreement) under the 
presidency of Donald Trump, after supporting the Agreement in 2015 
under Barack Obama.6 
Unlike other political and social issues facing today’s world, climate 
change is unique in that a successful solution needs to be truly global. 
Because climate change involves greenhouse gases being mixed in the 
air, pollution from one region spreads and affects the environment of 
the whole world. Large amounts of greenhouse gases, such as carbon 
dioxide and methane, trap heat close to the earth’s surface leading to 
“global warming” and other climate changes throughout the world.7 
Consequently, any deal to combat climate change must be international 
to be effective. Global warming and other effects of greenhouse gases 
have led to numerous environmental consequences around the world, 
including rising sea levels, unpredictable precipitation and weather 
patterns, and more extreme and frequent natural disasters.8 These 
changes in biodiversity and global temperature patterns threaten the 
availability of natural resources for all human activities.9  
4 JOS G.J. OLIVIER ET AL., TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS: 2014 REPORT, NETH. 
ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY 4–5 (2014), http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/news_docs/jrc-
2014-trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2014-report-93171.pdf. 
5 Canada and Kyoto: A History of the Country’s Involvement and Its Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/canada-kyoto/ (last updated 
Dec. 12, 2011). 
6 Jillian Ambrose, Donald Trump Sends Barack Obama’s Climate Change Rules Up in 
Smoke, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/ 
2018/08/21/donald-trump-sends-barack-obamas-climate-change-rules-smoke/.  
7 William Collins et al., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, SCI. AM. (Oct. 6, 
2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/science-behind-climate-change/. 
8 See generally NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (NASA), How Climate Is 
Changing, http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2019). 
9 Id. 
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The environmental impacts of climate change affect developing and 
least developed nations most severely, as these countries have larger 
and more vulnerable populations, fewer mitigations technologies, and 
more resource-based economies.10 Developing nations are more 
dependent on stable weather conditions to earn a living, grow food, and 
avoid sickness.11 While the poorest nations often face the harshest 
consequences of global warming, they are not the biggest producers of 
greenhouse gas emissions.12 In addition, developing nations often lack 
influence at international climate meetings, and are therefore unable to 
pressure bigger, polluting nations to adapt and adhere to strict 
environmental standards.13 For example, while the United States is the 
largest producer of greenhouse gases, it was one of only three countries 
not to ratify the Protocol.14  
Despite over twenty years of failed negotiations, delegates meeting 
in Paris were optimistic about drafting an agreement that all member 
nations would accept.15 And, for a while, it seemed that the dream had 
come true: for the first time, the COP culminated in a legally binding 
climate deal to which all members had pledged support.16  
The Agreement calls on nations to set emission reduction standards 
that will hold global temperatures to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial 
levels.17 In addition, member parties promise to raise $100 billion a 
year by 2020 to help poor countries explore newer sources of energy 
and adapt their economies to comply with emission reductions.18 
10 A Bad Climate for Development, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14447171. 
11 See generally M. Monirul Qader Mirza, Climate Change and Extreme Weather 
Events: Can Developing Countries Adapt?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 233 (2003). 
12 See generally Union of Concerned Scientists, Each Country’s Share of CO2 
Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/global-
warming/science-and-impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html (last updated Oct. 
11, 2018). 
13 See Brian Merchant, The Only Nations That Haven’t Signed 1997’s Global Climate 
Treaty Are Afghanistan, Sudan & the U.S.A., TREE HUGGER (November 28, 2011), 
http://www.treehugger.com/climate-change/only-nations-havent-signed-1997s-global-
climate-treaty-are-afghanistan-us.html. 
14 Id. 
15 The Road to a Paris Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/at-climate-talks-three-letters-
almost-sunk-the-deal. 
16 Id.  
17 John Vidal et al., World Leaders Hail Paris Climate Deal as “Major Leap for 
Mankind,” THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2015/dec/13/world-leaders-hail-paris-climate-deal. 
18 Id. 
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Finally, the Agreement aims to achieve zero net emissions globally 
within the century.19  
The Agreement was applauded as one of history’s greatest 
diplomatic accomplishments because all 195 member countries finally 
cooperated and achieved an emission reduction mechanism. While it 
was a strong step in the right direction, the Agreement represented a 
delicate balance of diplomacy, politics, and trade-offs, putting it at risk 
of imploding with the first change of the international landscape. The 
United States’ withdrawal from the Agreement serves as a testament to 
the instability of any international climate agreement, and the need for 
an enforcement mechanism for all agreements. This Article argues that 
it is important to establish an international climate court that will 
enforce and implement the Agreement and any subsequent agreements. 
The climate court would ensure that nations uphold their commitments 
to current and future climate agreements regardless of changes in 
governments, economic conditions, or political relations. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A. Climate Change Facts 
There is undeniable evidence that the world is getting warmer. The 
world’s temperature increased by 1.4°F over the last decade, and the 
ten-year period from 2001 to 2010 was the warmest in history. 20 This 
rise in temperature is correlated with human-produced carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases, which trap heat within the earth’s 
atmosphere.21 Rising temperature is causing several adverse 
environmental impacts. For example, sea levels rose an average of 6.7 
inches in the last century, with most of this rise concentrated in the last 
decade. Ocean tops (about 2,300 feet deep) have warmed 0.302°F since 
1969.22 And, ice sheets and icebergs have shrunk in Greenland, 
Antarctica, and the Arctic.23 The temperature rise has led to more 
frequent and extreme heat waves, rainfalls, floods, droughts, and 
19 Id. 
20 Climate Change: How Do We Know?, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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hurricanes.24 And even when climate change does not necessarily cause 
natural disasters, it does exacerbate them. These not-so-natural events 
have depleted natural wildlife habitats and have led to rapid and 
widespread extinction.25 Eventually, the destruction of certain species 
and natural landscapes will cause imbalances in ecosystems, deplete 
sources of fresh water, accelerate the spread of disease, and interfere 
with everyday human activity.26  
B. A Brief History of Climate Change Conferences 
In 1972, after years of global pressure to address the environmental 
impacts of human activity, the U.N. initiated the world’s first climate 
talks—the UN Conference on the Human Environment.27 Maurice 
Strong served as the secretary general for the meeting, which 
culminated in the first international climate change agreement, the 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. The declaration acknowledged that “[a] point has been 
reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the 
world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences. 
Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible 
harm to the earthly environment . . . .”28 The declaration also set 
principles to guide governments in the “preservation and enhancement 
of the environment,” and offered financial and organizational advice.29 
It also gave birth to the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), to catalyze governmental implementation of environmental 
protection plans.30 However, the UNEP lacked legal enforcement or 
implementation power, and any recommended action was ultimately 
left up to governments.31 
In 1988, the UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to gather “the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
24 Effects of Global Warming, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://environment.national 
geographic.com/environment/global-warming/gw-effects/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
27 Mark Allan Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 
ENVTL. L. 291, 293 (1990). 
28 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Stockholm Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972). 
29 Gray, supra note 27, at 310. 
30 Id.  
31 See id. at 312.  
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information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of 
human-induced climate change, its potential impacts, and options for 
adaptation and mitigation.”32 The IPCC ensures that U.N. climate 
change activities are in line with scientific understanding of climate 
change and that the U.N. actions incorporate the latest and most 
effective technologies to curb climate change.33  
Following the establishment of the IPCC, the international 
community reconvened, in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
to launch a united action plan against global climate change.34 The 
Summit ended with the finalization of the U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an international treaty “to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”35 
The 1994 UNFCCC created the Conference of the Parties (COP) as 
its main review body.36 The COP is entrusted with promoting effective 
implementation of the UNFCCC and is responsible for facilitating 
information sharing between parties, coordinating climate measures by 
multiple parties, developing methods to track levels of greenhouse 
gases, and evaluating the effectiveness of those measures.37 The parties 
held the first COP in Germany in 1995, which set the framework for 
the drafting of the Protocol at the third COP held in Kyoto, Japan, in 
1997.38 The Protocol was finally enforced in February 2005 and legally 
bound industrialized countries that ratified the Protocol to reduce 
emissions by 5.2% of 1990 levels by 2012.39  
After ratification of the Protocol, the parties met in 2007 for the 
thirteenth COP and drafted the Bali Road Map, which included the Bali 
Action Plan.40 The Bali Action Plan renewed the goal of addressing 
32 Principles Governing IPCC Work, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/09/ipcc-principles.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2019). 
33 Id. 
34 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Mar. 21, 1994, 
treaty source [hereinafter UNFCCC].  
35 Id. 
36 History of UN Climate Talks, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.c2es.org/content/history-of-un-climate-talks (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Bali Road Map Intro, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/ 
the-big-picture/milestones/bali-road-map (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
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climate change with a common vision, mitigation strategy, adaptation, 
technology, and financing mechanism.41 The Plan was followed by the 
Copenhagen Accord (the Accord), which was drafted and signed at the 
fifteenth COP in 2009.42 The Accord involved more non-binding 
emission reduction standards for industrialized nations and called for 
developing nations to take “nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions.”43  
In 2010, the sixteenth COP took place in Mexico and culminated in 
the Cancun Agreements.44 At the sixteenth COP, countries made their 
previous emission pledges official, which made the Cancun Agreement 
the largest and most ambitious agreement to reduce emissions to date.45 
Moreover, the nations agreed to hold each other mutually accountable. 
The Accord also laid out comprehensive mechanisms for developed 
countries to assist developing countries with mitigation actions.46 In 
2011, recognizing the need for a new, legally binding agreement that 
extends beyond 2020, world governments held the seventeenth COP 
and drafted the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.47 In 2012—the 
original due date of the Protocol—parties realized their lack of progress 
toward the Protocol’s goals and drafted an amendment to the Protocol, 
known as the Doha Amendment (the Amendment).48 The Amendment 
raised the emission reduction requirement to eighteen percent below 
1990 levels by 2020. The parties also expressed the need for a universal 
climate change agreement by 2015. And hence, the 21st COP took 
place in Paris in 2015 with hopes to finally establish an international 
climate agreement.49 
41 Id. 
42 COP 15 Copenhagen, CTR. C2ES: CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/content/cop-15-copenhagen/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
43 Id.  
44 Cancún Climate Change Conference – November 2010 – Meetings Page, U.N. 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/event/cancun-climate-change-conference-november-
2010-meetings-page (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Durban Climate Change Conference – November 2011 – Process and Meetings Page, 
U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/past-
conferences/durban-climate-change-conference-november-2011/durban-climate-change-
conference-november-2011 (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).  
48 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, C.N.718.2012, art. 3, para. 1 bis, Dec. 8, 
2012, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2012/CN.718.2012-Eng.pdf. 
49 Id. 
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II 
ARGUMENT 
A. Evaluating the (Un)Success of International Climate Efforts 
Although the Protocol was drafted in 1997 and contained goals for 
countries to meet by 2012, it was not ratified until 2005—almost half 
way into the action term.50 While certain European countries were on 
track to meet or exceed their goals during this period, other countries, 
such as China and the United States, had such high levels of emissions 
during this time that they completely obliterated any reductions by 
other countries.51 The United States did not ratify the Protocol and 
continued to emit greenhouse gases at levels higher than any other 
country, setting a poor precedent for the rest of the world.52  
Developing countries were excluded from the reduction targets 
because they have contributed comparatively less to the global rise in 
greenhouse gases.53 However, many developing countries, especially 
emerging economies, such as India and China, currently employ older, 
less energy-efficient technologies that are increasing pollution levels in 
those regions.54 The Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
(CBDR) concept first gained legal foothold in Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration of 1992.55 It states:  
In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. 
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view 
of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and 
of the technologies and financial resources they command.56  
At Rio, the United States stated that it “does not accept any 
interpretation of Principle 7 that would imply a recognition or 
acceptance by the United States of . . . any diminution of the 
50 Robert Henson, What Is the Kyoto Protocol and Has It Made Any Difference?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2011, 5:45 A.M.), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/ 
mar/11/kyoto-protocol. 
51 Id. 
52 Gregor Erbach, Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. 
SERV. BLOG (June 4, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-559475-
Doha-Agreement-Kyoto-Protocol-FINAL.pdf. 
53 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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responsibilities of developing countries under international law.”57 On 
the contrary, developing countries argue that their economic growth 
depends on the exploitation of resources, and it is unfair to expect them 
to invest in costly energy-efficient technologies when other 
industrialized nations did not face similar restrictions during their 
development.58 This ongoing debate, which concerns the level of 
responsibility developing nations should take to reduce emissions, is a 
key obstacle to any international agreement.59 
After creation of the Doha Amendment to the Protocol, key 
polluters, such as the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and some 
developing countries, again did not submit commitments.60 With only 
forty-one countries ratifying it, the Amendment was never enforced.61  
The 15th COP in Copenhagen was a similar story. The conference 
was marked with tensions, accusations, and embarrassing inaction, 
until the United States and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, 
India, and China) hashed out a weak last-minute agreement. While the 
Copenhagen Accord included specific emission reduction targets for 
industrialized countries, it did not include any legal framework to 
enforce these guidelines.62 Developed countries agreed to provide $100 
billion a year by 2020 to developing countries for climate 
improvement, but no implementation strategy was developed, and 
countries continue to disagree on the amount and sourcing of the 
funds.63  
The same obstacles to a climate deal reoccurred at almost all climate 
meetings. Many key parties, such as the United States and the BASIC 
57 U.S. interpretive statement on World Summit on Sustainable Development 
declaration, 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 13, 
§A(1)(b), at 768-69.
58 See Carbon Brief Staff, The UN climate talks have a responsibility problem, CARBON 
BRIEF (Nov. 20, 2013, 2:30 P.M.), http://www.carbonbrief.org/the-un-climate-talks-have-a-
responsibility-problem. 
59 See Shelley Ranii, Do Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Belong in the Post-
2015 SDGs?, CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION (Mar. 21, 2014), http://cic.nyu.edu/blog/global-
development/do-common-differentiated-responsibilities-belong-post-2015-sdgs. 
60 Elena Kosolapova, August Update on Doha Amendment Ratification, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Aug. 20, 2015), http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/august-update-on-doha-
amendment-ratification/ (stating that at least three-quarters of the nations that are party to 
the Kyoto Protocol needed to sign the Doha Amendment for it to go into effect.) 
61 Id. 
62 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Fifteenth 
Session, Draft Decision -/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 
18, 2009), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
63 Id. 
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countries, were reluctant to approve a predetermined, legally binding, 
emission reduction requirement. These countries advocated instead for 
a non–legally binding, self-directed program of emission reduction that 
would be informally tracked and enforced.64 Other countries, such as 
countries of the European Union, advocated for a more heavy-handed 
approach. They argued that a watered-down agreement will fail to 
pressure nations to take necessary measures to reduce emissions.65 The 
European Union often points to the Copenhagen Accord as evidence of 
the failure of a weak deal to persuade nations to take efforts to reduce 
emissions.66 
Despite years of climate conferences, negotiations, and international 
agreements, nations failed to reach a deal that is firm enough to address 
the issues, realistic enough to be implemented, and thorough enough to 
be effective. Even when diplomats understand the importance of 
climate change action, bureaucracies prevent timely approval and 
ratification of treaties. For example, the President of the United States 
cannot pledge emission reductions without congressional approval.67 
This required congressional approval often slows negotiations and 
prevents the President from speaking on behalf of the entire 
government.68 
Considering that any deal will be effectively worthless without the 
support of high-emitting countries such as the United States and 
Canada, delegates at the 20th COP proposed a deal that would allow 
discretion for countries to set their own emission reduction goals. 
Under this discretionary plan, countries will not have fixed deadlines 
for when their goal must be submitted to the COP and will not have an 
objective standard to evaluate whether each goal is appropriate for its 
country’s stage of development.69 This lack of an enforcement 
mechanism is perhaps the most serious challenge to implementing any 
international climate deal. One solution is to establish an international 
climate court to enforce the Agreement and any future agreements. This 
64 See Vinita Banthia, UN Countries Strive to Develop Legal Framework for Climate 
Deal, MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH.: LAWSCI FORUM (Oct. 28, 2015), https://editions.lib.umn. 
edu/mjlst/un-countries-strive-to-develop-legal-framework-for-climate-deal/. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Why Did Copenhagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009, 
16:33 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8426835.stm. 
68 Id. 
69 Oren Cass, Why the Paris Climate Deal is Meaningless, POLITICO (Nov. 28, 2015, 
9:57 AM EST), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/11/why-the-paris-climate-
deal-is-meaningless-000326. 
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court could be referred to as either the “International Climate Court,” 
or “International Tribunal for Climate Justice,” and would monitor the 
progress of all nations and advise them accordingly. It would ensure 
that the agreement is interpreted and applied fairly for all countries. If 
a nation is in violation the agreement, the court will be able to 
administer a judgment against the nation and employ sanctions.  
B. The Details of the Paris Deal 
The Agreement calls on nations to “[hold] the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels. . . .”70 Unlike previous targets, this target in the 
Agreement is scientifically backed by the IPCC as the temperature 
reduction needed to avoid “‘catastrophic’ impacts.”71 Furthermore, 
developed nations are called upon to contribute at least $100 billion a 
year to developing countries to assist them in transforming their 
technologies and economies to embrace lower-emitting options.72 
C. Limitations of the Paris Deal: A Reality Gap 
The Agreement was originally signed by 195 countries, but in order 
to be legally binding, 55 countries covering at least 55% of global 
emissions had to ratify it before 2020.73 This condition was met by the 
end of 2016, and the Agreement went into effect by November 4, 
2016.74 However, as many had predicted, the optimism of its 
ratification may once again prove to be short-lived.75 Under the 
Agreement, the United States had pledged to cut its emissions between 
26% and 28% below 2005 levels by 2025, and commit close to $3 
70 U.N. Framework on Convention Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Twenty-
first session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 
12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf. 
71 Peter Fairley, How the Paris Climate Deal Happened and Why it Matters, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Dec. 16, 2015, 16:59 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy 
/policy/paris-agreement-expands-global-ambition-on-climate-action. 
72 Id. 
73 John D. Sutter, Hooray for the Paris Climate Agreement! Now What?, CNN (Dec. 14, 
2015 11:57 AM EST), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/opinions/sutter-cop21-climate-5-
things/. 
74 Paris Agreement Ratification Tracker, CLIMATE ANALYTICS, https://climate 
analytics.org/briefings/ratification-tracker/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
75 See Eric J. Lyman, Paris Climate Deal: Hard Work Comes Next, USA TODAY (Dec. 
14, 2015, 3:07 PM EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/12/13/paris-
climate-deal-what-comes-next/77248106/. 
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billion in aid for developing countries.76 And as the world’s second 
largest polluter, the United States has seriously threatened the success 
of the Agreement by withdrawing its support. 
A further limitation of the Agreement is that parties will be 
independently deciding emission reduction standards. There is no 
minimum reduction expected, but countries are expected to reconvene 
every five years to tighten their reduction plans.77 Additionally, while 
the Agreement calls for a 2°C limit on temperature rises, the emission 
reductions proposed by individual countries so far is only expected to 
meet half this amount.78 This inherent discrepancy in the Agreement 
further points to a gap between its expectations and reality. 
Furthermore, the call for developed nations to fund developing 
nations is not “legally binding” because it is only in the preamble of the 
Agreement. Although developing countries fought long for a binding 
fund from developed countries, they eventually relented and settled for 
a preamble promise.79 Oil and gas backed economies, such as Russia’s 
and Saudi Arabia’s, were convinced by Angela Merkel of Germany and 
former United States President Barack Obama to accept a legally 
binding emission reduction mandate.80 Therefore, the final document 
is a result of extensive negotiation and compromise, which makes it 
more likely for members to deviate from its mandate.81 
Finally, although the Agreement is “legally-binding,” there are very 
few mechanisms of enforcement. The thirty-one-page Agreement does 
not provide for any official consequences for countries that fail to meet 
their emission reduction goals. Instead, the Agreement will be enforced 
through international pressure and shaming.82 This method may be 
effective as countries are afraid of “looking bad” to trade partners and 
76 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-
agreement.html. 
77 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-
change-accord-paris.html. 
78 Id. 
79 Danny Lewis, Four Things to Know About the Paris Climate Deal, 
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/four-
things-know-about-paris-climate-deal-180957547/. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Samantha Page, No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding. Here’s Why That 
Doesn’t Matter., THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
climate/2015/12/14/3731715/paris-agreement-is-an-actual-agreement/. 
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allies, but this method is not guaranteed to ensure compliance with 
climate treaties at all costs. In addition, richer nations have more power 
to pressure poorer nations, which is leading to an imbalance of 
responsibilities. Therefore, a more effective enforcement method is 
needed to ensure compliance with the Agreement and any agreement 
that comes after it.83 
D. Proposal of an International Climate Court: Structure, 
Governance, and Mandate 
At the pre-Paris meeting in Bonn, Germany, the delegation from 
Bolivia recommended establishing a climate court as part of a deal 
reached in Paris. The proposal made it into the draft document to be 
discussed in Paris and read as follows: 
An International Tribunal of Climate Justice . . . is hereby established 
to address cases of non-compliance [with] the commitments of 
developed country Parties on mitigation, adaptation, provision of 
finance, technology development and transfer . . . , capacity-building, 
and transparency of action and support, including through the 
development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into 
account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance.84 
The proposal was intended as a mechanism to hold industrialized 
countries accountable for their obligations to developing nations under 
the deal.85 These obligations include pledges of funding, as well as 
emission reductions.86 As such, the court would only have enforcement 
jurisdiction over developed countries that have submitted 
commitments and developing countries “that have made economy wide 
quantified emission reduction commitments, with respect to their 
83 See generally Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice 
Movement: The Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 244 (2010). 
84 Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Second 
Session, Part Eleven, Draft Agreement and Draft Decision on Workstreams 1 and 2 of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, art. 11(1), at 19, (Oct. 
20, 2015, 4:00 AM) http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/mechanical_light_ 
editing.pdf (alteration in original) (internal brackets in original omitted) [hereinafter Draft 
Agreement of Ad Hoc Working Group]. 
85 Sara Malm, UN Planning an “International Tribunal of Climate Justice” Which 
Would Allow Nations to Take Developed Countries to Court, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 2, 2015 
10:40 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3300366/UN-planning-international-
tribunal-climate-justice-allow-nations-developed-countries-court.html. 
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commitments on mitigation and support.”87 The lawsuits would be 
brought by developing countries.  
However, the proposal of the international climate court was not 
ultimately adopted in the final agreement in Paris. Hence, for the 
proposal to be adopted, it would need to be included in a separate U.N. 
resolution or as an amendment to the Paris Agreement. One-third of 
member nations would have to sign the amendment for it to have 
jurisdiction and avoid infringing state sovereignty.88 In order for the 
court to hold fair and consistent trials, the amendment should outline 
specific procedures and the mandate of the court. It should establish 
judicial procedures that the court will follow, as well as the elements 
and standards the court will apply when it makes a decision.  
The document must also lay out consequences and sanctions for 
specific violations. For example, consequences could involve trade 
sanctions. To be most effective, the court should work in coordination 
with other U.N. bodies, such as the World Trade Organization, which 
has the power to impose tariffs and other economic sanctions to 
countries that produce products in environmentally unfriendly ways.89 
Depending on the level of deviation, the violating country may also 
face fines, increased reduction requirements for the following emission 
review cycle, or be required to provide a new environmental 
technology to a poorer nation.  
As per the original proposal, the court would function as somewhat 
of a committee.90 The committee would have two branches—a 
compliance branch and an implementation branch. In addition, the 
compliance mechanism would be further divided into two branches—
an enforcement branch and a facilitative branch.91 While the 
enforcement branch would mainly be used against developed countries, 
the court would also have “a facilitative branch for developing country 
Parties,” which would assist with mitigation actions as opposed to 
punish non-compliance.92 The draft also noted that a decision body of 
the court “shall be based on equitable geographical representation, and 
87 Draft Agreement of Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 84, art. 11, “Option II: 2ter,” 
at 20.  
88 Id. 
89 See Juan Cole, After the COP21 Paris Climate Accord, What We Need is an Int’l 
Climate Court, INFORMED COMMENT (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.juancole.com/2015/12/ 
after-climate-accord.html. 
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to include representation of least developed countries and small-island 
developing States.93 The body shall comprise twelve members. 
Decisions of the Compliance Committee shall be made by consensus 
where possible and, as a last resort, by a two-thirds majority.”94  
Because countries are responsible for setting their own emission 
reduction standards, issues will arise if nations take advantage of the 
flexibility in the deal and do not set high enough standards that are in 
accordance with their technological capacities. High-polluting, 
advanced countries may set low reduction goals and leave a high 
burden on poorer, developing nations to pick up the slack. To counter 
this impact, the compliance branch of the court could offer declaratory 
judgments to nations that wish to evaluate their standards. The 
facilitative branch could offer evaluations regarding the progress 
nations are making. Also, the implementation branch will advise nation 
decision makers about setting appropriate targets based on their level 
of development.  
Unlike in the initial proposal for the court, the court should not only 
have jurisdiction over developed nations but also developing nations. 
However, since developing nations have different emission reduction 
standards, the court would apply different standards when evaluating 
developing countries and developed countries. In addition, sanctions 
against developing nations would be limited and proportional to the 
countries’ economic stature. 
E. Challenges to Implementing the Court and Proposed Solutions 
The first reason why the international climate court proposal was not 
ultimately included in the Agreement is that nations are reluctant to 
accept a rigid governance structure, including predetermined emission 
reduction requirements, and the threat of sanctions for non-
compliance.95 Therefore, one major obstacle to implementing the court 
will be getting countries to ratify it. While many developing countries 
that do not have stringent emission reduction expectations, such as 
China and India, were strongly in favor of an international climate 
court, the United States was opposed to the plan, for fear of being one 
of the first industrialized nations that will be dragged to court.96 
93 Id. at 22. 
94 Id. 
95 See Malm, supra note 85. 
96 Id.  
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Therefore, the court could be built on the model of other 
international courts such as the International Court of Arbitration and 
the International Criminal Court, which have grown in importance and 
popularity since their creation.97 These courts are successful because 
they offer all nations a mutual and neutral platform for justice.98 While 
each country will be at risk of being sued, each country will also be 
able to take other, noncomplying nations to court. And, because there 
is a joint interest in reducing emissions, nations will likely eventually 
agree to hold each other mutually accountable. Furthermore, the 
reluctance of most high-polluting nations is precisely why the court is 
needed. While initial lawsuits may burden developed nations, allowing 
nations to bypass their emission requirements will perpetuate the 
decades-long failure of climate deals. Because nations are allowed to 
set their own emission reduction goals, the court will only be holding 
each nation to its own standards. 
Concerns have also emerged over the loss of national sovereignty 
and self-governance of nations if the United Nations is afforded the 
power to punish nations that do not comply with international treaties. 
For example, some Americans have expressed concerns that the United 
Nations will be able to bypass Congress, take the President to court, 
and force the United States to ratify an agreement.99 However, the 
United Nations will not have the power to force a country to ratify the 
climate court Amendment to the Agreement without the country 
agreeing to be a party to the Agreement first. This is how previous 
international courts have been implemented, which have required 
nations to agree to implementation of the court.100 However, if a dispute 
comes up between nations that are not members of the amendment, and 
if both nations agree to use the court at the time of the dispute, they will 
be able to. In addition, countries will have the option of only ratifying 
parts of the amendment. For example, a country may initially only want 
to accept the implementation branch, and not sign on to the compliance 
97 See Thomas H. Oehmke, Arbitrating International Claims—At Home and Abroad, 81 
AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 4 (2001). 
98 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, U.N.; Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 1, 2002), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/rome-statute.aspx. 
99 Leo Hohmann, U.N. Planning Court to Judge U.S. for “Climate Justice”, WND (Nov. 
1, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2015/11/u-n-tribunal-to-judge-u-s-for-climate-
debt/. 
100 Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/ 
jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
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branch, which holds the enforcement authority. One reason 
international arbitration courts have been successful is because they are 
flexible, and all countries have a say in the location, procedure, and 
mechanism of proceedings.101  
CONCLUSION 
Although flexibility will water down the amendment, the court will 
still have immense value in incentivizing nations to comply with the 
Agreement. Regardless, establishing an international climate court will 
be a lengthy and challenging undertaking. Issues of national 
sovereignty, fairness, resources, and implementation pose obstacles to 
the creation of a climate court, even after member countries agree to 
sign an amendment to the Agreement. However, if the Agreement is to 
be enforced in a meaningful way, it is important that countries, 
especially richer, developed countries, face some tangible 
consequences for non-compliance. If the country leaders come together 
once again, as they did in Paris, they will be able to come up with a 
balanced, strategic plan to enforce the Agreement that they have 
worked on for too long to see go to waste. 
101 See generally LATHAM & WATKINS, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
(2015).  
